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Abstract:
In an experimental study we examine a variant of the ￿minimum effort game￿, a
coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the
least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles,
winks and handshakes could be recognized and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign
of each other’s trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more
rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may
indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and
substantial.
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1. Introduction
Many social interactions can be modeled as coordination games. In these games, the players have a
common interest, but the desired outcomes are only achieved if the players coordinate on the same
action, in which case an equilibrium is reached. In this paper we will examine coordination games in
which the equilibria can be Pareto ranked. In such games the players face a double coordination problem.
First, they want to coordinate on an equilibrium, and second, they prefer to do so at the best equilibrium.
Since players need to choose an action before observing the action(s) of the other player(s), to go for the
Pareto efficient equilibrium, what is crucial is that ￿they can trust each other￿ (Harsanyi & Selten
[1988], p. 89) to do so.
1 In other words, the players need some shared understanding of the situation and
of the appropriate course of action this implies. There is some game-theoretic as well as experimental
literature focusing on the idea that explicit preplay communication may (or may not) help to establish
such trust (see, e.g., Harsanyi & Selten [1988], Aumann [1990], Farrell & Rabin [1996], Charness
[1998], or Clark et al. [2001). In this paper we will pursue a different track. We will test experimentally
the idea that trust may be established in an alternative way, i.e., instead of through explicit preplay
communication.
There is a growing body of (sometimes casual) empirical evidence that simple cues play an
important role concerning the perception of trustworthiness.
2 Such cues may be unconscious, hard-wired
and shaped through evolution (as seems to be the case for some body language, facial expressions, or
tone of voice), but they may also be the result of deliberate choice behavior. Smiles, winks, handshakes,
hairdos, tattoos, clothing, and personalized numberplates may fall in the latter category. These simple
cues provide a fast and frugal way to signal a certain ￿attitude￿ or trustworthiness. The fact that they are
quick and economical makes these cues effective in situations in which a quick establishment of trust is
necessary, such as in casual, anonymous encounters, e.g., in traffic (pedestrian or otherwise), in which no
explicit preplay communication is possible. More importantly, however, these simple cues also seem to
play a crucial role in many situations where there is scope for extensive communication, as the direction
this communication takes may depend to a large extent on the effect of these powerful cues.
For example, if there are two things concerning job interviews about which there is consensus
among the specialists, it is that the first minute is the crucial one, and that a candidate needs to make eye
contact, smile, and give a firm handshake. Handshakes are essential for members of masonic lodges too.
They use a ￿secret handshake￿ to tell the ￿insiders￿ from the ￿outsiders￿.
3 A smile is recognized as an
important asset for many small businesses, as it is the first thing most people notice about others, and
many people withhold custom from businesses that they perceive as being ￿unfriendly￿.
4 Obviously, major
business deals are not based on a smile alone. But the details of such business deals are only worked out
and negotiated if trust is present, and this is the main reason why most important business communication
                                                
1 Gambetta [1988] defines trust as follows: ￿When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we
implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is
high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him￿ (p. 217). See also Coleman [1990].
2 See, e.g., Snijders [1996] and the references therein.
3 A game-theoretic analysis of the evolutionary stability of ￿secret handshakes￿ can be found in Robson [1990].
4 See Sherwin [2001].3
tends to be conducted face-to-face, even in the age of the Internet. As London [2001] puts it, ￿a good
Chardonnay and a firm handshake are still worth a million bytes￿, and as British Airways [2002]
explains, if one needs to trust a business partner, ￿it’s better to be there￿. Trust in business dealings is
established within a framework of explicit and tacit understandings regarding interaction routines and
exchange practices, for which the relevant social norms may differ from country to country. A recent
series of articles in the Financial Times, reviewing business methods in various countries, illustrated the
importance in this respect of factors such as the decorum that surrounds meeting and greeting, the use of
first names or full titles, handshakes and direct eye contact, hugging, kissing and comfort distances, and
dressing codes.
5 Establishing trust is equally important in international relationships, and the methods
employed are similar too, with a distinguished role for etiquette and chivalry in diplomatic practice. Even
when two countries have been in conflict for a long time, the first eye contact between new leaders is
often considered to be of crucial importance for the future of the conflict. An example showing that such
cues may play a role not only in establishing trust between people who meet for the first time, but even
in maintaining trust in the case of repeated interactions is the one concerning long-standing doctor-
patient relationships. Patients who do not trust their doctor to have done everything he could to
prevent their unfortunate health state take their resort increasingly to lawsuits. Scheck [2000],
therefore, suggests the following trust-building mechanism to dermatologists: ￿A smile a day keeps the
lawsuits away￿. Finally, many people have raised the practice of using cues to establish trust to an art
form: ￿flirting￿.
In other words, there is ample evidence that common manifestations such as handshakes, smiles,
or winks can be used to establish trust. Therefore, in this paper we will test experimentally in a common
interest game with Pareto ranked equilibria whether such simple cues could play a role as coordination
devices.
To consider this question, we take up the example of two potential business partners who need to
work out the details of a deal. We model this as a variation of the ￿minimum effort game￿ (see Van Huyck
et al. [1990]). We organize a laboratory experiment in which this game is played pairwise and repeatedly,
but each time with a randomly chosen opponent. In each round of the game, both players simultaneously
choose an ￿effort level￿. The payoff of each player depends on his own choice of effort level and the
minimum of the two choices. Any coordinated outcome, i.e., any outcome in which both players choose
the same effort level, is an equilibrium with symmetric payoffs. The equilibria can be Pareto ranked, and
the efficient equilibrium is the one in which both players choose the highest effort level. The equilibrium
with the lowest effort choices and payoffs, however, is less risky, because each player can be certain not
to have chosen a greater effort level than his partner. This tension between payoff and risk considerations
makes it a particularly suitable game to study the question how the necessary trust to achieve efficient
coordination may be established.
The focus of our paper concerns the moment in which the two businessmen meet, i.e., before they
actually decide how much effort to put in to work out the details of a deal. We model the decorum
surrounding their meeting and greeting as follows. At the start of each round the players are casually
                                                
5 See Frank [2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d].4
asked to communicate to each other that they are set to play the game. A player can indicate either that
his current state is a plain ￿ready￿, or that it is ￿smiling￿. The question, then, is whether these vague state
messages, which are as such unrelated to the specifics of the game, acquire endogenously a commonly
understood meaning. That is, we investigate whether the players recognize and exploit the opportunity of
reporting their current state to send a reliable signal of their trustworthiness, such that the state reports
submitted by the players act as a cue foreshadowing a common understanding that allows them to feel
reassured enough to go for the more risky (but potentially more rewarding) strategy of the Pareto
dominant equilibrium.
Varying details of this preplay stage, while playing the same tacit ￿minimum effort game￿, we
examine three different treatments. In the base treatment, the two players report their current state
costlessly and simultaneously before they make their effort level choices. In a second treatment, we
introduce small costs of reporting a ￿smiling￿ state, to test whether this might separate the ￿noisy￿ from
the more serious smilers. In addition to these costs, in a third treatment, the players communicate their
current state sequentially, to test whether the players might care about avoiding conflicting signals. The
main findings of our analysis can be briefly summarized as follows.
•  Frequency of smiles: Smiling is practiced by a steady minority of the players. When
we introduce a small cost of smiling, the frequency of smiles is significantly lower
than with free smiles. When the players are asked to report their state sequentially,
the frequency of ￿smile-smile￿ pairs is significantly higher than in the simultaneous
treatment.
•  Effort levels: The average effort levels in ￿smile-smile￿ pairs is significantly greater
than in mixed pairs or in non-smiling pairs. The average effort level is significantly
greater with costly smiles than with non-costly smiles, both in same signal and mixed
signal pairs, whereas the average effort level of pairs without smiles does not differ
significantly across treatments.
•  Payoffs: The average payoff in ￿smile-smile￿ pairs is significantly lower than in other
pairs.
In other words, the players realize they can use their state report as a coordination device, and the smiles
are used and recognized as genuine tell-tale signs of trustworthiness. However, although the information
value of the smiles is significant and substantial, the evolution of signaling and effort level choices in our
experiment does not prevent inefficient coordination.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the game and the treatments.
The details of the experimental procedures are described in section 3, whereas the hypotheses to be
tested are spelled out in section 4. The results are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2. The game and the treatments
In this section we first present the underlying tacit coordination game that we employed throughout
the experiment, and then explain how our experimental design offered the players the opportunity to
develop a ￿secret handshake￿, and the details of the different treatments in this respect.5
We study a variation of the ￿minimum effort game￿ as presented by Van Huyck et al. [1990]. This tacit
coordination game resembles a typical team situation such as, for example, the one concerning potential
business partners who need to work out a deal. First, all players simultaneously choose an individual
￿effort level￿. The payoff of the deal, then, is determined by the minimum of the chosen levels. Finally,
each player receives the payoff of the deal minus the cost of his own effort. In this class of games, two
incentives work against one another. On the one hand, each player’s additional payoff from increasing the
team’s minimum effort level is always greater than his own marginal effort. That is, the business deal is
one that is worth being worked out. On the other hand, each player has to bear his own effort cost, but
only the minimum level is relevant for the payoff of the project as such. Hence, only combinations of
strategies with all players choosing exactly the same effort level are equilibria of the game, with the
payoff dominant one being the one in which all players exert the maximum possible effort. The payoffs
of the game in the parameter setup we study are presented in the player interface reproduced in Figure 1.
In our experiment this game was played pairwise for fifty rounds, with the players being randomly
matched in each round.
6
Figure 1  Player interface
                                                
6 See Appendix A1 for the instructions given to the subjects. Notice, in particular, that we do not use the word
￿effort￿ in the experiment.6
As can be seen, coordinating on the efficient equilibrium is risky, because the cost of a coordination
failure is high for a player choosing a high effort level. For example, a player who chooses ￿7￿ when his
team mate chooses ￿1￿, suffers a loss of 54 points compared to having also chosen ￿1￿. Furthermore, the
advantage of being coordinated is relatively small, since players who coordinate on the efficient
equilibrium (both choosing ￿7￿) earn only 6 points more than playing the ￿safe￿ strategy (choosing ￿1￿),
for which no coordination is necessary. Therefore, this particular parameterization of the game implies
that, to go for the Pareto efficient equilibrium, a player needs a great deal of trust that his partner will not
let him down. Hence it seems well-suited for the examination of the emergence of a cue telling the
trustworthy from the others.
7
We now turn to the preplay phase. At the outset of every new round, before they could go on to play
the minimum effort coordination game, each player was asked to report one and only one of two possible
states: ￿ready￿ or ￿smiling￿. These buttons can be seen in the player interface in Figure 1. Each round
would start only after all players had pressed one of their state buttons. Hence, a choice had to be made,
and no default was given. In all treatments, these states were communicated to both players before they
made their effort level choices. Notice that whereas the minimum effort coordination game can be seen
as a deal to be struck by two potential business partners, this preplay phase corresponds to the decorum
surrounding their meeting and greeting.
In the base treatment (SimFree) both players would indicate a state simultaneously, i.e., each had to
select a state before having information on the state choice of the other player. Once they had both
received communication of their state decision, they could choose their effort level in the coordination
game. What is more, either state could be reported with no costs. Our experiment involved two more
treatments: a simultaneous costly signal treatment (SimCost), and a sequential costly signal treatment
(SeqCost). In the costly signal treatments (SimCost and SeqCost), reporting a ￿smiling￿ state incurred a
minor cost of 0.5 points, while reporting ￿ready￿ was for free. In the sequential signal treatment
(SeqCost), one of the players was randomly chosen (with equal probabilities for both players) to report
his state first. The state chosen was transmitted to the other player, who then chose his own state, which
in turn was sent to the first player.
Hence, varying our two control variables, signal cost and signal order, allows us to check and to
isolate the effects of both control variables in two-way comparisons. Comparing SimFree to SimCost
informs us on the effect of introducing a signal cost, while comparing SimCost to SeqCost informs us on
the difference between a simultaneous and a sequential signaling mode.
Notice that there are some slight differences in the equilibria of the three treatments. In the SimFree
game, the outcome of any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium consists of any of the Nash equilibria of the
                                                
7 In Van Huyck et al. [1990], play evolved to the least efficient equilibrium in a group version of the minimum
effort game, whilst coordination on the efficient equilibrium is achieved if agents are paired repeatedly with the
same opponent, but no coordination is attained when subjects are randomly paired round after round.
Berninghaus & Ehrart [1998], however, suggest that these results may be sensitive to the number of rounds
played, with the coordination problem becoming less severe if the players know that they are going to play a7
minimum effort game combined with any constellation of ￿ready￿ or ￿smile￿ signals. In both the SimCost
and SeqCost games, however, the set of outcomes of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria can be
characterized as follows. Any constellation of ￿ready￿ or ￿smile￿ signals can occur. If both players signal
￿ready￿, this can be followed by any of the Nash equilibria of the minimum effort game. But if at least one
player sends a ￿smile￿, then it is followed by a Nash equilibrium of the minimum effort game with an
effort level strictly greater than ￿1￿. The explanation for the latter result is in both cases (SimCost and
SeqCost) the same. If a player anticipates that his smile will be followed by the least efficient Nash
equilibrium of the minimum effort game, he will not smile because it would give him a payoff of 20.5,
whereas any equilibrium of any subgame if he sends a ￿ready￿ signal would give him a payoff of at least
21.
Before we explain the experimental procedures in the next section, let us make some observations
concerning this preplay phase. First, the players are asked to express their mood. In principle, the
reported state is a personal, non-interactive trait. The question, then, is whether the players will turn the
originally internal state report into an interaction tool, reporting their state to signal trustworthiness. In
other words, we focus on cues that can be used in a deliberate, strategic manner as they are open to
voluntary control.
8 In this sense our study complements the literature examining cues as the result of
uncontrollable, emotional trembling of muscles (see, e.g., Ekman [1985], or Frank [1988]). Three
experimental studies more in line with this latter approach, abstracting from the signaling and trust-
building as choice behavior, are Ockenfels & Selten [2000], Eckel & Wilson [1998], and Scharlemann et
al. [2001]. The former studies whether an audience is able to detect involuntary truth-signaling by
players in a bargaining game, reporting a mainly negative finding. The latter two test the effect of facial
expressions, either of stylized icons or of actual photographs taken from a database, in one-shot
extensive-form games, and find significant (although weak) effects of smiling faces.
9
Second, explicit communication in the coordination game presented in Figure 1 is ￿self-enforcing￿ in
the sense that if a player could signal his intention to choose a certain effort level, then (assuming the
other player believes him) he has no incentive to choose a different effort level. This means, for example,
that if in the original tacit coordination game a player’s risk considerations lead him to choose ￿1￿, he
would have no incentive to signal an intention of choosing any higher effort level.
10
                                                                                                                                                        
larger number of rounds. See also Goeree & Holt [2001] on minimum effort games with various degrees of
riskiness.
8 As Scheck [2000] recommends in her lawsuit prevention model: ￿I don’t care what kind of day you are having
-- fake it￿ (p. 2).
9 Our paper complements these latter two studies also in the sense, first, that in our common interest game trust
does not conflict with equilibrium behavior, and second, that we study the evolution of the meaning of a smile.
10 See, e.g., Harsanyi & Selten [1988], Farrell [1988], or Aumann [1990]. Of course this does not rule out equilibria
such as ￿babbling equilibria￿, in which players send random messages, and the receivers just ignore them. At the
theoretical level, inefficient equilibria of this sort can be ruled out by appealing to refinements that presuppose a
commonly understood meaning of the signal (which may or may not be believed - see, e.g., Farrell [1993]).
However, this is not possible in our experiment, where the meaning of a signal is not clear a priori, and a player
may fail to interpret the signal in the same way as his opponent.8
Third, we examine ￿two-way communication￿, i.e., both players are required to communicate their
current state. This can lead to signal conflict problems. For example, one party may send a signal
suggesting a high effort, without receiving such a signal from the other side. In such a case, it is hard to
tell whether the sender will actually stick to the signaled action or not. Since he did not receive a signal,
it is not clear why he should expect that the other player will coordinate on the best equilibrium. Hence,
for a stable and reliable signal to emerge, the players must learn to overcome this signal coordination
problem. As is well-known, one-way communication may lead to improved coordination, as no mis-
coordinated signals can arise (see, e.g., Cooper et al. [1989]). We consider two-way communication
because we want to focus on signaling as choice behavior, and in some sense our sequential signaling
treatment encompasses one-way signaling. For suppose that one-way communication would work, in the
sense that after a smile both players would trust each other to go for the risky efficient equilibrium. If this
were the case, then in our sequential treatment SeqCost it would be straightforward for the second player
to confirm this common understanding by replying with a smile.
Fourth, throughout the paper we will often use the words ￿communication￿, ￿signal￿ and ￿signaling￿
when we refer to the preplay stage in which the players indicate that they are set for the next round,
reporting their current state. It should be noted, however, that the preplay phase of our experiment is
different from cheap talk in experiments in which players are explicitly asked to announce their planned
action, which they could possibly do strategically (see, e.g., Cooper et al. [1992], Charness [1998],
Blume & Ortmann [2000], or Clark et al. [2001). The game in our experiment is also not a signaling (or
sender-receiver) game, as all subjects play the same symmetric complete information game presented in
Figure 1.
11 Blume et al. [1998] studies the endogenous evolution of the meaning of signals in such
sender-receiver games, with the payoffs of each type of sender being common knowledge.
12 The
message space is a priori meaningless, and the question is whether the players can learn to reach a
common understanding as to the meaning of the abstract signals, distinguishing the various types of
senders. Our experiment complements this study in the sense that the interest of the game in Blume et al.
lies in the fact that there is incomplete information, whereas in our experiment there is only one type of
player, with the coordination problem arising because of the tension between payoff and risk
considerations. Moreover, in our experiment the players are not told that there is any relation between the
preplay phase and the coordination game. They need to discover themselves that they could use the state
reports as a signaling device to establish trust in the game to be played. In other words, whereas Blume et
al. focus on the evolution of the meaning of signals (as there is no doubt as to which signals are
available and why they should be used), our paper makes a further step towards studying the emergence
of signaling itself.
                                                
11 Obviously, this is not strictly true to the extent that the subjects’ risk-attitudes might not be common
knowledge. Although this might play some role, it should be noted that even if we had perfect experimental
control of the subjects’ preferences, the whole issue of equilibrium selection, and the role of trust therein, would
remain equally relevant.
12 According to Crawford [1998], this is the only other experimental study in which the endogenous
determination of the meaning of signals is studied.9
Fifth, and related to the previous point, we consider a ￿pocket-sized￿ signaling space, which, in
particular, is smaller than the action space. The essential reason for this is that the objective of our paper
is exactly to examine the relevance of simple cues as coordination devices. In this sense our experiment
complements the cheap talk experiments that use a much richer language. Notice that the fact that the
signaling space is smaller than the action space needs not prevent efficient coordination. Since all players
prefer to coordinate on the same, Pareto efficient equilibrium, to achieve efficient coordination they need
only one thing: trust. The signal space in our experiment allows the emergence of a cue telling the
trustworthy from the other players. This is different from sender-receiver games, in which typically the
number of types of senders corresponds to the number of available actions, with each type preferring to
coordinate on a different action (see, e.g., Blume et al. [1998]). In those games, the size of the signal
space needs to match that of the action space to allow the players to distinguish all types and to
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium.
13
3. Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of Bonn (Laboratorium f￿r experimentelle
Wirtschaftsforschung) in Germany between the summer of 2000 and spring of 2001. Our subject pool
consisted mainly of students of law and economics. The subjects voluntarily signed up for the
experiment one or two weeks before the session. They were given no information concerning the
contents or goals of the experiment beforehand. They were randomly assigned to one of the three
treatments.
The experiment was computerized using RatImage (Abbink and Sadrieh [1995]). The subjects were
seated in closed cubicles throughout the session. Upon arrival at the laboratory, each participant drew a
card that determined the cubicle in which he took a seat. After all participants were seated, the written
instructions (see Appendix A1) were read aloud by the experimenter. All questions were answered
individually, inside the cubicle.
Sixteen participants took part in each session. The subjects were divided into two independent
groups of eight participants in each session. The members of an independent group only interacted with
subjects from within that group. The subjects were not informed of the size of the independent groups.
They were only told that they would be randomly matched to some other participant in every round.
Eight subject groups, i.e., eight independent observations, per treatment were planned. The plan was
met for the simultaneous non-costly (SimFree) and the sequential costly (SeqCost) signals treatments.
Due to a technical problem, in the simultaneous costly signal (SimCost) treatment one session had to be
canceled, so that only six observations could be realized.
                                                
13 There is also an extensive evolutionary literature on equilibrium selection in coordination games, establishing
conditions under which only efficient equilibria are consistent with various notions of evolutionary stability, and
discussing in particular also the issue of the size of the signal space (see, e.g., W￿rneryd [1991, 1993], Blume,
Kim & Sobel [1993], Weibull  [1995], Blume [1998], and Hurkens & Schlag [2000]).10
The experiment consisted of fifty rounds, which was known to the players. At the outset of each
round, the eight members of each independent group were randomly matched to form four pairs. Then
the signaling phase started. In the simultaneous signaling treatments, all signaling decisions were
collected and then redistributed to the corresponding pairs. In the sequential signaling treatment, half of
the subjects were randomly chosen to be the first movers in the signaling phase. Their signals were
collected and sent to their partners. Then the signals of the second movers were collected and transmitted
to the corresponding first movers. This procedure had been described to the subjects. It was emphasized
that in any given round it would be equally likely for each player to become first or second mover in the
signaling phase. The signaling phase was followed by the tacit coordination game, in which all effort
level choices of the subjects were collected. After all decisions were made, each subject would be shown
his own choice plus the smallest value chosen in his match (but not by subjects in any other pairs), and
the next round began.
The final payoffs of the subjects were equal to the sum of their payoffs over the fifty rounds, plus a
DM 3.50 show-up fee. The experimental exchange rate was DM 3.50 per 100 points, and the average
earnings per player was about DM 47. The duration of a session was between 70 and 100 minutes,
including the time for instructions and post-experimental debriefing. The currency exchange rate at the
time of the experiment was approximately $ 0.48 for DM 1.00.
4. The Hypotheses
Starting with the basic question whether a cue of trustworthiness enabling coordination on the
efficient equilibrium emerges, and taking into account the two treatment variables (signal cost and signal
order), we divide the hypotheses into three groups. First, if such a cue emerges, a number of predictions
can be made about the average effort level choices and resulting payoffs within each treatment. We
summarize these predictions in the hypotheses 1 and 2. While hypothesis 1 conveys what it means for a
signal to be reliable, hypothesis 2 is based on the fact that coordinated play leading to efficient outcomes
should increase the payoffs of subjects.
Hypothesis 1: If a practice of smiling emerges, pairs using the signal will choose higher
effort levels on average than non-smiling subject pairs.
Hypothesis 2: If the smile is used as in hypothesis 1, then the average payoff of a player in
a pair using that signal will be higher than that of other subjects.
Second, the essential purpose of the introduction of a signaling cost was to deter non-meaningful
signaling, so that a small penalty would be enough to break indifferences, leading to a reduction of
￿noisy￿ signals, i.e., smiles that were not intended as coordination devices. This results in our hypotheses
3 and 4. Note that hypothesis 4 is congruent with the characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria11
given in section 2, where the lowest effort level of  ￿1￿ was ruled out in pairs with at least one costly
smile.
14
Hypothesis 3: Costly smiles will be less frequent than non-costly ones.
Hypothesis 4: Costly smiles will be more likely to be used as coordination devices for high
effort level choices than non-costly ones. That is, higher average effort levels will be
observed in signaling pairs with costly smiles than in signaling pairs with non-costly smiles.
Third, the signal order treatment variable was introduced to gain some insight into the effects of the
signal conflict problem of the simultaneous two-way communication treatments, as mis-coordinated
signals do not really help to achieve coordination in the minimum effort game. In case the players care
about using the signals as coordination device, in the sequential signaling treatment they would have an
easy opportunity to coordinate their signals. In particular, it would allow any player who did not plan to
smile to revise his choice to ￿smiling￿, after having received a ￿smiling￿ signal from the other player. This
inspired the following hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 5: Sequential signaling will lead to less signal conflicts than simultaneous
signaling, i.e., to a smaller number of mixed signal pairs.
5. The Results
In this section we give a detailed analysis concerning the signaling frequency, effort levels, and
resulting payoffs separately. We first present in Tables 1, 2 and 3 a summary for each of the treatments
SimFree, SimCost, and SeqCost, respectively.
15 In each row, the statistics for one of the possible signal
constellations is presented. All statistics reported are the average of the corresponding statistics for the
independent observations. Since each independent observation consists of eight subjects playing 50
rounds, the frequencies of the different signal constellations sum up to a total of 200 pairwise cases for
each independent observation. Notice that in the case of simultaneous signals, i.e., in SimFree and
SimCost, a differentiation between ￿ready-smile￿ and ￿smile-ready￿ pairs is meaningless, while it makes
sense in the case of sequential signals, i.e., in SeqCost. For the across treatment comparisons the data of
the two mixed signal configurations are pooled in SeqCost. These pooled statistics are shown in the extra
columns inserted for the mixed signal constellations in Table 3.
                                                
14 Hypothesis 4 is also based on the same intuitive argument on which the forward induction solution is based.
15 More detailed tables can be found in Appendix A2.12
Table 1: Treatment SimFree ￿ Simultaneous and Non-Costly Signals






ready - ready 42.1%  (84.1) 1.5  (1.3) 17.7  (10.4)
mixed signals 45.6%  (91.3) 1.5  (1.3) 17.5  (10.2)
smile - smile 12.3%  (24.6) 2.3  (1.7) 14.2  (14.4)
Averages of the corresponding variables over the 8 independent observations
Table2: Treatment SimCost ￿ Simultaneous and Costly Signals






ready - ready 79.1%  (158.2) 1.6  (1.0) 19.3  (7.3)
mixed signals 19.7%  (39.3) 2.3  (1.6) 14.6  (13.6)
smile - smile 1.3%  (2.5) 4.6  (1.8) 12.3  (16.0)
Averages of the corresponding variables over the 6 independent observations
Table 3: Treatment SeqCost ￿ Sequential and Costly Signals






ready → ready 80.6%  (161.3) 1.4  (1.0) 18.3  (8.0)
















smile → smile 6.4%  (12.8) 4.0  (2.0) 11.0  (16.1)
Averages of the corresponding variables over the 8 independent observations13
5.1. Frequency of Signal Constellations
In the SimFree treatment, the overall frequency of ￿ready-ready￿ pairs is almost equal to the
frequency of mixed signal pairs and significantly greater than the frequency of the ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test, α < 1%, one-tailed). In the other two treatments (SimCost and SeqCost), the
general observation is that the frequency of ￿ready-ready￿ pairs is significantly greater than the frequency
of mixed signal pairs, which in turn is significantly greater than the frequency of the ￿smiling-smiling￿
pairs (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, α < 2%, one-tailed).
Comparing the column ￿number of cases￿ across the three tables reveals that non-costly smiles are
much more frequently used than costly ones. In the non-costly signal treatment SimFree players smile on
average 35 percent of the time, while this is 11 percent in the costly SimCost treatment (and 13 percent
in the SeqCost treatment). The difference is significant at a level of α < 1%, one-tailed (Mann-Whitney
U-test). Thus, signal cost clearly has the effect predicted by our hypothesis 3.
Although signal order does not seem to have an effect on the frequency with which subjects choose
to report the ￿smiling￿ state, it does have a significant effect on the avoidance of signal conflicts as
predicted by hypothesis 5. There are significantly less mixed signal pairs and significantly more ￿smile-
smile￿ pairs in the sequential signal treatment SeqCost than in the simultaneous signal treatment SimCost
(Mann-Whitney U-test, α < 5%, one-tailed). In fact, in the simultaneous SimCost treatment, 88.7 percent
of the smiles occur in mixed pairs, while this is 50.5 percent in the sequential SeqCost treatment.
 Figure 2, which depicts the development of signal constellation frequencies in ten-round blocks for
each treatment, shows that although there are no clear trends in the development of the distribution of
signal constellations over time, there are some interesting developments. For example, the relative
frequency of mixed signal pairs rises over time in the SimCost treatment, while it falls in the SeqCost
treatment.
16
                                                
16 The increase of the frequency of mixed pairs in SimCost is significant at α < 10% (Wilcoxon signed ranks test;
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Figure 2
5.2. Choice of Effort Levels
One of the important questions of our analysis is whether effort level choices are correlated to the
signal choices. Figure 3 reports for each treatment the distribution of all effort levels across all rounds
for each independent observation, i.e., group of eight players, distinguishing again the various signal
constellations. The thick lines identify the median effort level for each group, the boxes represent the
25th and 75th percentile, and the whiskers the 5th and 95th percentile.
We make the following observations. First, in all treatments the median effort in ￿ready-ready￿ pairs
is always ￿1￿ with just one exception in the SimCost treatment. Second, in the costly treatments (SimCost
and SeqCost), the median effort level in smiling pairs is always above the minimum effort of ￿1￿, and it is
always higher than in the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs (with a single exception, which is the same as the one
above). Third, for each of the three treatments there is a group for which the median effort level chosen
by smiling pairs equaled the maximum possible effort (￿7￿).15
Figure 3
The average effort level chosen by subjects in each of the possible signal constellations of each treatment
was shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 above. In all three treatments, the average effort level increases with the
number of smiles. It is lowest in the non-smiling pairs and highest in the smiling pairs, with the mixed
signal pairs taking the middle position. This supports hypothesis 1, which predicted higher effort levels
in signaling pairs. Statistical tests provide further evidence for hypothesis 1. In the simultaneous non-
costly signal treatment SimFree, the subjects in ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs choose significantly higher effort
levels than the subjects in the mixed signal pairs and the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs (Wilcoxon signed ranks test,
α < 5%, one-tailed). The difference between the mixed and the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs is not significant. In
the simultaneous costly signal treatment SimCost, the subjects in the mixed signal pairs choose
significantly higher effort levels than the subjects in the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs (Wilcoxon signed ranks test,
α < 2%, one-tailed). Since ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs appear only in three of the six independent groups in
this treatment, the tests cannot pick up significant differences between this and the other two
constellations, even though the average effort level in these pairs is more than twice as high as in the
other pairs. In the sequential costly signal treatment SeqCost, both tests are significant. Subjects in the
￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs choose significantly higher effort levels than subjects in the mixed signal pairs,
who in turn choose significantly higher effort levels than the subjects in the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test, α < 1%, one-tailed). Hence, smiling is used as a cue foreshadowing the
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Although all three treatments show the same type of correlation between state signal choice and
effort level choices, there is a clear treatment effect. Comparing the average effort levels across
treatments, we notice that there are no treatment differences concerning the effort level choices of
￿ready-ready￿ pairs. In both the mixed signal and the ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs, however, the signal cost
variable has a significant effect on effort level choices. This supports hypothesis 4, since subjects in these
constellations choose significantly higher effort levels when the signal is costly than when the signal is
non-costly. This result is clearly related to the significant drop in the frequency of observed smiles when
a signal cost is introduced. The signal cost induces a self-selection, separating those who use the signal
strategically from those who would use the signal for other reasons (or without any reason), if it were for
free.
Finally, an important regularity concerning the development of the average effort levels over time
should be noted. Figure 4 depicts the development of the average effort level choices for each signal
constellation in ten-round blocks for each treatment. It is not surprising that in the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs the
average effort level choices decrease over time with a tendency to converge to the lowest possible level,
namely ￿1￿. The same type of decline holds for the mixed signal pairs, and for the ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs
in the non-costly signal case.
17 This hints at stability requirements of the signaled coordination.
Apparently, the one-sided smiling in the mixed pairs cannot stabilize on high effort level choices. An
interesting aspect of the data is that such a decline does not occur in the costly signal treatments
(SimCost and SeqCost).
18 That is, although even ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs seem to have problems
stabilizing high effort choice behavior, small signal costs may help as they sort out those subjects who
would otherwise smile without choosing high effort levels.
                                                
17 All these declines in effort levels are significant at α < 5% (Wilcoxon signed ranks test; one-tailed).
18 The clear increase in average effort in SimCost is not significant due to the small number of observations.17
Figure 4
5.3. Payoffs
Comparing the results of the last two sub-sections, one question comes to mind. Why does the
frequency of ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs not rise, even when subjects are genuinely signaling high effort
choices? The key to answer this question is the measure of ￿success￿: although subjects in ￿smiling-
smiling￿ pairs are genuinely signaling trustworthiness, they are not successful in achieving high payoffs.
Tables 1, 2, and 3 showed that while in every treatment the average effort level choice rises with the
number of smiles in a pair, the average payoff drops. In the simultaneous non-costly signal treatment
SimFree, the subjects in ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs receive significantly lower payoffs than the subjects in
the mixed signal pairs and the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, α < 2%, one-tailed),
while the difference between the mixed and the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs is not significant. In the simultaneous
costly signal treatment SimCost, the subjects in the mixed signal pairs receive significantly lower payoffs
than the subjects in the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, α < 2%, one-tailed). Just as in
the case of the effort levels, the statistical tests cannot pick up significant differences between ￿smiling-
smiling￿ pairs and the other two constellations, because of the low frequency of ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs in
the data. In the sequential costly signal treatment SeqCost, the subjects in the ￿smiling-smiling￿ and the
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(Wilcoxon signed ranks test, α < 5%, one-tailed). The difference between the ￿smiling-smiling￿ and the
mixed signal pairs, however, is not significant, even though the overall averages are relatively far apart.
Figure 5
Figure 5 depicts the development of the average payoffs for each signal constellation in ten-round blocks
for each treatment. In the ￿ready-ready￿ pairs of all treatments, there is a clear tendency for convergence
to the ￿safe￿ equilibrium payoff of 21 points. The same type of development, but starting at a lower level,
can be seen in the mixed signal pairs. This is due to the fact, that the average effort level choice in these
pairs over time tends towards the lowest level (see Figure 4). Matters are different in the ￿smiling-
smiling￿ pairs. The average payoff of the subjects in these pairs also increases over time, but only in the
non-costly signal treatment (SimFree) is this due to a convergence towards the ￿safe￿ equilibrium. In the
other two treatments (SimCost and SeqCost), the reason for the positive development in the payoffs of
￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs is the increase in coordinated effort choices, although these coordination
successes are not enough to drive payoffs all the way up to the level of payoffs in the ￿safe￿
equilibrium.
19
                                                
19 The increases in the payoffs for mixed signaling pairs in the SeqCost treatment, and for ￿smiling-smiling￿ pairs
in both the SimCost and SeqCost treatments are not significant (partly due to the small number of observations). All
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Hence, it seems that the subjects who are trying to use the smile as a coordination device are chasing
a dream. They set out to improve their own and their partner’s situation by signaling trustworthiness and
choosing high effort levels, but end up earning substantially less than the payoff of 21 points that they
could have for sure by choosing the lowest effort level. On average, the subjects who try to coordinate
using the smile signal do not even manage to make up for the losses over time. Hence, hypothesis 2 must
be rejected.
As explained in section 2, to achieve efficient coordination all the players need is a shared
understanding of a cue signaling trustworthiness. As it turns out in our experiment, the path to reach such
an unambiguous understanding seems too difficult. While the smiling emerges as a convention signaling
trustworthiness, it seems the players have not reached sufficient agreement as to what degree of trust is
implied by a smile, i.e., how much risk they can afford to take in the ￿minimum effort game￿. In the
experiment, players in smiling pairs most frequently chose the effort levels ￿3￿, ￿4￿, and ￿7￿. Hence, while
some subject smiles and plans to choose the effort level ￿3￿, it may happen that his partner smiles
intending to go for ￿7￿. If two smiling players who have different plans meet, then inevitably one of them
will be hurt. It appears that this lack of coordination, following from some players being more cautious
with trust than others, prevents a spreading of the signaling convention.
6. Conclusions
The main conclusion is that the analysis of the experimental data presents significant and substantial
evidence that cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes can play a role as coordination devices by
establishing trust. First, subjects recognize the necessity of a coordination instrument. They discover
and exploit the state button as an information channel to make use of it as a meaningful
communication device, genuinely signaling high effort levels through smiles. Second, small costs are
enough to separate the serious from ￿noisy￿ signalers, as these costs implied less signaling but higher
effort choices for smiling pairs. Moreover, in the costly treatments both the frequencies and effort
levels of smiling pairs did not diminish over time. Third, subjects aim at coordinating signals when
possible, as there were more smiling (and fewer mixed) pairs in the sequential state report treatment.
Notwithstanding the fact that our experimental findings support the casual empirical evidence cited
in the introduction that simple cues can be used as meaningful coordination devices, signaling
trustworthiness, we do not observe a tendency to widespread smiling behavior. Hence, further analysis
of the dynamics of the development of trust is needed. Understanding how trust is established exactly
is clearly an issue of which the relevance goes beyond the minimum effort game, as trust is recognized
increasingly as a lubricant enabling organizations and societies to achieve Pareto superior outcomes
(see, e.g., Arrow [1974], Gambetta [1988], Fukuyama [1995], La Porta et al. [1997], or Kramer
[1999]).20
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Appendix A1: Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple. If you follow
them closely and make appropriate decisions, you may make a substantial amount of money. These earnings will
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. From now on until the end of the experiment you are not
allowed to communicate with each other. If you have a question, please raise your hand.
In this experiment there will be 50 market rounds. In each round, you will be in a market with one of the other
participants, where in each of the 50 rounds this will be a person that is randomly assigned to you. In each round
both you and the other person in your market will pick a value of X. The value you pick and the smallest value
picked for X in your market (including your own choice of X) will determine the payoff you receive.
The values of X you may choose are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. You are provided with a table on your handout and on
the screen showing your payoff for every possible combination of your own X choice and the minimum X
choice in your market. Please look at the table now. You will find your payoff for a round as follows: First, look
for the row that is marked on the left side with the X-Value that you chose. Then look for the column that is
marked with the smallest value chosen by any participant in your market at the top. For example, if you choose a
4 and the smallest value chosen is 3, you earn 14 points that round.
To be sure that everyone has understood the instructions so far, we would like to ask you to please complete the
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Each round starts only after all participants have pressed one of their state buttons. The states of all participants
in your market are displayed to you. [In each market, one of the participants first reports his/her state. This state
is shown to the other participant. Then the second participant reports his/her state and this state is shown to the
first participant. Which one of the participants is first to report his/her state, is determined randomly in every
round.]* [Only reporting the ￿ready￿ state is free of cost. Reporting any other state costs 0.5 points.]** In each
round you make your decision by pressing your choice of X at the left hand side of the payoff table. Once all
participants have made their decision, the round ends and you will be informed of the results of your market. The
smallest value of X in your market and the corresponding payoff for you will be indicated in the payoff table,
and also in a separate feedback window. Moreover, your total payoffs up to the current round will be indicated in
a separate status window.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid according to the total payoffs you realized. For every 100 points
gained you will receive DM 3.50. Additionally, you will receive a lump sum of DM 3.50 for participating in the
experiment. The cash is paid to you in a separate room. No participant can see what the other participants have
earned.
If you have any questions, please ask them now.
* The sentences in these brackets were included in the treatment SeqCost, but not in SimFree and SimCost.
** The sentences in these brackets were included in the treatments SimCost and SeqCost, but not in SimFree.23
 Appendix A2: Data at the Level of Independent Observations
Tables A1 to A3 present the data at the level of the independent observations, i.e., as frequencies for each of the
groups of 8 players.24
Table A1: Treatment SimFree ￿ Simultaneous and Non-Costly Signals
ready-ready  pairs mixed signal pairs smiling-smiling pairs
effort payoff effort payoff effort payoff round # of
pairs #
mean s.d. mean s.d.
#
mean s.d. mean s.d.
#
mean s.d. mean s.d.
Group 1
all 200 88 1.4 1.2 18.6 9.0 92 1.3 1.2 19.2 7.7 20 1.5 1.6 16.7 14.2
1-10 40 17 2.6 2.3 11.1 18.1 20 2.5 2.1 13.5 14.9 3 3.2 2.7 1.5 24.6
11-20 40 23 1.1 0.3 20.4 2.9 15 1.1 0.4 20.4 3.2 2 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0
21-30 40 16 1.1 0.3 19.9 3.0 21 1.0 0.2 20.8 1.4 3 2.0 2.2 12.0 20.1
31-40 40 13 1.1 0.3 20.3 2.4 21 1.0 0.2 20.8 1.4 6 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0
41-50 40 19 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 15 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 6 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0
Group 2
all 200 75 1.5 1.5 17.4 11.9 103 1.5 1.4 18.6 9.5 22 4.9 2.3 11.7 19.2
1-10 40 23 2.5 2.3 9.9 19.4 13 3.7 2.6 10.3 19.6 4 5.0 2.6 5.0 25.0
11-20 40 20 1.1 0.3 20.3 2.4 18 1.3 1.1 18.0 9.5 2 7.0 0.0 27.0 0.0
21-30 40 6 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 28 1.1 0.2 20.5 2.0 6 5.0 2.1 10.0 18.9
31-40 40 9 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 24 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 7 4.9 2.2 12.8 17.0
41-50 40 17 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 20 1.2 1.0 19.2 8.6 3 3.2 1.8 11.5 15.9
Group 3
all 200 66 1.4 1.2 18.7 8.2 97 1.4 1.1 17.7 10.0 37 1.8 1.9 14.2 16.0
1-10 40 18 1.9 1.6 16.3 9.6 17 2.2 2.1 10.1 18.5 5 3.1 2.6 6.1 22.0
11-20 40 14 1.0 0.2 20.7 1.7 22 1.3 0.8 18.1 7.6 4 2.8 2.5 5.3 22.4
21-30 40 17 1.3 1.1 18.6 9.6 19 1.2 0.5 19.4 4.1 4 1.3 0.4 18.8 3.9
31-40 40 10 1.3 1.1 18.8 9.8 17 1.2 0.9 18.9 7.9 13 1.4 1.2 17.2 10.6
41-50 40 7 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 22 1.0 0.2 20.6 1.9 11 1.5 1.7 16.1 15.5
Group 4
all 200 96 1.2 0.8 20.1 4.9 88 1.4 1.3 18.1 10.5 16 1.2 0.5 19.6 4.6
1-10 40 13 2.2 2.0 15.7 11.8 23 2.2 2.0 11.8 17.3 4 1.5 0.9 16.5 7.8
11-20 40 25 1.0 0.1 20.8 1.3 14 1.0 0.2 20.7 1.7 1 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0
21-30 40 22 1.0 0.1 20.8 1.3 16 1.0 0.2 20.7 1.6 2 1.3 0.4 18.8 3.9
31-40 40 19 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 19 1.1 0.2 20.5 2.0 2 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0
41-50 40 17 1.1 0.3 20.5 3.0 16 1.2 1.0 19.3 9.4 7 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0
Group 5
all 200 117 1.3 1.3 19.0 9.2 71 2.0 1.8 15.5 12.9 12 2.3 2.0 9.4 17.9
1-10 40 19 3.0 2.6 9.8 20.2 17 3.8 2.3 9.6 17.7 4 3.8 2.8 -3.8 25.4
11-20 40 22 1.1 0.3 20.4 3.0 16 1.8 1.6 13.7 14.1 2 1.8 0.8 14.2 7.5
21-30 40 24 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 13 1.5 1.4 16.5 12.3 3 1.5 0.5 16.5 4.5
31-40 40 28 1.0 0.1 20.8 1.2 11 1.1 0.3 20.2 2.6 1 1.5 0.5 16.5 4.5
41-50 40 24 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 14 1.1 0.4 20.0 3.7 2 1.5 0.5 16.5 4.5
Group 6
all 200 38 1.3 1.3 18.0 12.1 104 1.1 0.7 19.7 6.1 58 1.5 1.4 17.4 10.9
1-10 40 8 2.1 2.3 10.9 21.1 19 1.4 1.1 17.2 10.2 13 2.8 2.4 9.3 19.9
11-20 40 7 1.1 0.3 20.4 2.3 20 1.3 1.0 18.5 8.8 13 1.2 0.6 18.9 5.8
21-30 40 10 1.3 1.3 18.3 11.8 22 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 8 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0
31-40 40 7 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 22 1.0 0.2 20.6 1.9 11 1.1 0.3 19.8 3.1
41-50 40 6 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 21 1.0 0.2 20.8 1.4 13 1.2 0.4 19.6 3.2
Group 7
all 200 103 1.6 1.3 17.1 9.4 77 1.6 1.0 17.5 7.6 20 1.4 1.1 17.2 10.0
1-10 40 23 2.7 1.7 13.8 12.0 13 2.3 1.4 14.6 9.7 4 2.1 2.0 10.9 17.7
11-20 40 23 1.5 1.1 16.7 9.9 14 1.8 0.9 17.1 7.5 3 1.3 0.5 18.0 4.2
21-30 40 22 1.5 1.3 17.2 11.0 15 1.6 1.2 16.0 10.0 3 1.5 1.1 16.5 10.1
31-40 40 17 1.2 0.4 19.4 3.4 18 1.2 0.5 19.2 4.1 5 1.3 0.6 18.3 5.8
41-50 40 18 1.1 0.4 19.8 3.8 17 1.1 0.5 19.7 4.4 5 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0
Group 8
all 200 90 2.0 2.1 13.0 18.5 98 2.0 2.0 13.9 17.0 12 3.7 2.7 7.0 22.3
1-10 40 22 2.8 2.6 7.1 22.2 16 3.3 2.4 8.6 19.8 2 6.8 0.4 24.2 4.2
11-20 40 15 1.8 1.8 14.1 16.4 22 2.4 2.4 9.2 20.9 3 3.7 2.7 -3.0 24.7
21-30 40 16 2.2 2.3 11.6 20.1 21 1.9 2.1 13.3 18.9 3 2.7 2.4 6.0 21.8
31-40 40 18 2.0 2.2 12.0 20.1 20 1.4 1.3 17.4 12.0 2 3.3 2.3 5.8 18.2
41-50 40 19 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 19 1.0 0.2 20.8 1.4 2 2.5 2.6 7.5 23.4
Average of all groups
all 200 84.1 1.5 1.3 17.7 10.4 91.3 1.5 1.3 17.5 10.2 24.6 2.3 1.7 14.2 14.4
1-10 40 17.9 2.5 2.2 11.8 16.8 17.3 2.7 2.0 12.0 16.0 4.9 3.5 2.1 8.7 18.3
11-20 40 18.6 1.2 0.6 19.2 5.0 17.6 1.5 1.1 17.0 9.2 3.8 2.5 0.9 15.3 8.1
21-30 40 16.6 1.3 0.8 18.6 7.1 19.4 1.3 0.7 18.5 6.3 4.0 2.0 1.1 15.0 10.4
31-40 40 15.1 1.2 0.5 19.3 4.6 19.0 1.1 0.5 19.8 4.0 5.9 1.9 0.9 16.6 7.4
41-50 40 15.9 1.0 0.1 20.8 0.9 18.0 1.1 0.4 20.2 3.9 6.1 1.6 0.9 16.8 7.825
Table A2: Treatment SimCost ￿ Simultaneous and Costly Signals
ready-ready  pairs mixed signal pairs smiling-smiling pairs
effort payoff effort payoff effort payoff round # of
pairs #
mean s.d. mean s.d.
#
mean s.d. mean s.d.
#
mean s.d. mean s.d.
Group 1
all 200 188 1.5 1.4 18.8 8.1 12 3.3 2.6 6.8 21.0 0
1-10 40 37 3.0 2.3 13.6 14.6 3 5.2 2.3 6.6 22.2 0
11-20 40 38 1.3 0.8 18.4 7.3 2 4.0 2.5 -1.3 23.4 0
21-30 40 36 1.1 0.2 20.5 2.1 4 3.3 2.4 0.5 21.6 0
31-40 40 39 1.1 0.5 20.3 4.5 1 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 0
41-50 40 38 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 2 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 0
Group 2
all 200 188 1.2 1.0 19.3 8.3 12 2.1 2.2 10.6 20.0 0
1-10 40 36 1.9 1.7 14.6 14.6 4 2.1 2.0 10.6 17.6 0
11-20 40 38 1.2 1.0 19.3 8.7 2 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 0
21-30 40 39 1.1 0.7 20.2 6.1 1 4.0 3.0 -6.3 26.7 0
31-40 40 38 1.0 0.1 20.9 1.0 2 2.5 2.6 7.3 23.2 0
41-50 40 37 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 3 2.0 2.2 11.7 20.2 0
Group 3
all 200 101 1.2 0.9 19.7 7.0 91 1.4 1.3 18.6 9.1 8 5.8 2.2 12.7 21.3
1-10 40 20 2.0 1.9 14.4 14.5 19 2.7 2.4 11.7 17.6 1 4.0 3.0 -6.5 27.0
11-20 40 24 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 14 1.1 0.3 20.1 2.3 2 4.3 2.8 -3.8 25.0
21-30 40 20 1.0 0.2 20.8 1.4 18 1.1 0.5 20.0 4.4 2 6.5 0.9 21.0 8.4
31-40 40 21 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 18 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 1 7.0 0.0 26.5 0.0
41-50 40 16 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 22 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 2 6.8 0.4 23.8 4.2
Group 4
all 200 141 1.2 0.5 19.5 4.2 55 1.7 1.0 17.2 8.3 4 3.6 2.7 1.9 23.2
1-10 40 28 1.4 0.6 18.5 5.3 10 1.2 0.4 20.0 2.8 2 2.8 2.5 4.8 22.4
11-20 40 31 1.3 0.6 18.9 4.8 9 1.9 0.9 17.2 7.8 0
21-30 40 32 1.2 0.5 19.5 4.1 8 1.6 0.9 16.9 7.1 0
31-40 40 30 1.1 0.2 20.4 2.2 9 1.8 0.8 16.6 6.2 1 4.0 3.0 -6.5 27.0
41-50 40 20 1.1 0.4 20.1 3.4 19 2.0 1.2 16.2 11.1 1 5.0 2.0 4.5 18.0
Group 5
all 200 188 1.3 1.2 18.5 9.7 12 1.5 1.7 16.3 14.9 0
1-10 40 39 2.6 2.3 9.4 18.5 1 4.0 3.0 -6.3 26.7 0
11-20 40 37 1.0 0.2 20.6 1.8 3 2.0 2.2 11.7 20.0 0
21-30 40 37 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 3 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 0
31-40 40 37 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 3 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 0
41-50 40 38 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 2 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 0
Group 6
all 200 143 3.2 0.8 20.0 6.5 54 3.5 1.0 18.2 8.2 3 4.5 0.5 22.3 3.5
1-10 40 34 3.6 1.3 16.4 9.6 6 4.2 1.7 13.9 13.6 0
11-20 40 31 3.2 1.0 19.5 6.1 7 3.5 0.6 18.3 5.7 2 4.8 0.4 21.7 4.2
21-30 40 24 3.1 0.5 21.2 4.5 16 3.3 1.0 16.5 9.1 0
31-40 40 27 3.0 0.3 22.3 2.4 12 3.8 0.8 19.8 5.8 1 4.0 0.0 23.5 0.0
41-50 40 27 3.0 0.4 21.7 3.7 13 3.3 0.5 20.8 4.6 0
Average of all groups
all 200 158.2 1.6 1.0 19.3 7.3 39.3 2.3 1.6 14.6 13.6 2.5 4.6 1.8 12.3 16.0
1-10 40 32.3 2.4 1.7 14.5 12.9 7.2 3.2 2.0 9.4 16.8 0.5 3.4 2.8 -0.9 24.7
11-20 40 33.2 1.5 0.6 19.6 4.8 6.2 2.3 1.1 14.5 9.9 0.7 4.6 1.6 9.0 14.6
21-30 40 31.3 1.4 0.4 20.5 3.0 8.3 2.4 1.3 11.4 11.5 0.3 6.5 0.9 21.0 8.4
31-40 40 32.0 1.4 0.2 21.0 1.7 7.5 1.9 0.7 17.7 6.0 0.5 5.0 1.0 14.5 9.0
41-50 40 29.3 1.4 0.1 21.0 1.2 10.2 1.7 0.7 18.5 6.1 0.5 5.9 1.2 14.2 11.126
Table A3: Treatment SeqCost ￿ Sequential and Costly Signals
ready-ready  pairs ready-smiling pairs smiling-ready pairs smiling-smiling pairs
effort payoff effort payoff effort payoff effort payoff round # of
pairs #
mean s.d. mean s.d.
#
mean s.d. mean s.d.
#
mean s.d. mean s.d.
#
mean s.d. mean s.d.
Group 1
all 200 169 1.2 0.6 19.8 4.4 12 2.2 1.8 12.7 14.7 12 2.5 2.4 8.1 20.9 7 4.0 2.8 13.5 18.2
1-10 40 28 1.7 0.8 18.3 5.7 3 1.5 0.5 16.3 4.3 3 3.5 2.6 1.6 22.4 6 4.2 2.9 15.3 17.6
11-20 40 28 1.3 0.9 18.8 7.9 6 2.4 1.9 13.0 14.6 5 3.0 2.6 2.8 24.0 1 3.0 2.0 2.5 18.0
21-30 40 35 1.1 0.3 19.7 3.1 1 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 4 1.1 0.3 19.6 3.1 0
31-40 40 38 1.0 0.2 20.8 1.4 2 3.0 2.4 2.8 21.8 0 0
41-50 40 40 1.0 0.2 20.8 1.4 0 0 0
Group 2
all 200 180 1.4 0.8 18.6 6.2 7 1.9 1.0 18.1 5.6 9 2.2 1.5 15.3 10.8 4 3.4 1.7 11.6 12.2
1-10 40 30 2.1 1.1 15.6 8.7 3 2.7 0.7 19.1 4.2 3 2.0 0.8 18.4 4.8 4 3.4 1.7 11.6 12.2
11-20 40 37 1.7 1.0 17.1 7.9 1 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 2 3.3 2.3 5.5 18.1 0
21-30 40 35 1.3 0.7 18.3 6.2 3 1.5 0.8 16.3 7.0 2 2.5 1.1 17.3 4.6 0
31-40 40 38 1.1 0.3 20.4 2.7 0 2 1.3 0.4 18.5 4.0 0
41-50 40 40 1.0 0.1 20.9 1.0 0 0 0
Group 3
all 200 125 1.2 1.0 19.6 7.5 14 2.1 1.8 14.8 13.4 19 1.3 1.1 17.9 9.4 42 3.3 1.3 14.8 11.3
1-10 40 31 1.9 1.8 15.7 14.2 4 4.0 2.4 3.8 20.6 3 1.5 0.8 16.3 6.8 2 2.8 1.5 9.8 11.6
11-20 40 28 1.0 0.2 20.7 1.7 2 1.3 0.4 18.5 4.0 6 1.8 1.7 14.0 15.1 4 2.9 1.8 11.1 15.9
21-30 40 22 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 6 1.6 0.6 18.8 3.9 3 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 9 3.7 1.2 16.5 8.5
31-40 40 26 1.0 0.1 20.8 1.2 1 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 2 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 11 3.6 1.3 14.5 12.1
41-50 40 18 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 1 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 5 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 16 2.9 1.2 15.6 10.3
Group 4
all 200 139 2.2 2.2 11.9 19.2 11 2.8 1.8 12.1 12.8 33 1.6 1.6 16.3 13.5 17 6.0 1.6 18.2 14.6
1-10 40 32 2.7 2.1 11.8 16.9 5 3.1 1.8 9.9 16.3 1 2.0 1.0 11.7 8.8 2 4.3 2.2 6.3 23.2
11-20 40 30 1.9 2.1 12.6 19.3 1 2.0 1.0 11.7 8.8 5 2.4 2.4 12.2 18.2 4 6.0 1.3 18.0 10.6
21-30 40 26 1.8 2.0 13.4 17.9 3 3.0 2.1 12.7 10.0 10 1.6 1.8 14.9 16.1 1 7.0 0.0 26.5 0.0
31-40 40 25 2.1 2.3 11.3 20.7 1 2.5 0.5 17.3 4.8 9 1.4 1.4 17.3 12.4 5 6.4 1.2 21.9 9.3
41-50 40 26 2.2 2.4 10.3 21.2 1 1.5 0.5 16.3 4.8 8 1.1 0.2 20.2 2.3 5 6.2 1.6 17.7 15.7
Group 5
all 200 175 1.3 1.0 19.1 7.1 15 1.8 1.8 13.3 16.6 8 1.4 0.9 16.8 7.9 2 3.5 2.6 -2.0 23.4
1-10 40 37 2.2 1.6 14.8 12.6 3 3.2 2.7 1.3 24.8 0 0
11-20 40 34 1.4 0.9 18.6 7.0 5 2.1 1.9 10.9 17.1 1 2.5 1.5 7.3 13.8 0
21-30 40 27 1.1 0.2 20.5 2.1 6 1.1 0.3 20.0 2.6 5 1.4 0.7 17.2 6.1 2 3.5 2.6 -2.0 23.4
31-40 40 39 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 1 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 0 0
41-50 40 38 1.0 0.1 20.9 1.0 0 2 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 0
Group 6
all 200 195 1.3 1.0 19.1 7.5 5 2.7 2.3 7.4 19.2 0 0
1-10 40 37 2.3 1.8 12.9 14.7 3 2.8 2.0 7.6 15.9 0 0
11-20 40 38 1.2 0.6 19.3 5.0 2 2.5 2.6 7.3 23.2 0 0
21-30 40 40 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 0 0 0
31-40 40 40 1.0 0.0 21.0 0.0 0 0 0
41-50 40 40 1.0 0.1 20.9 1.0 0 0 0
Group 7
all 200 155 1.3 1.0 19.1 7.0 11 2.6 1.8 11.9 14.1 16 2.0 1.4 17.1 7.3 18 2.7 1.8 9.4 16.2
1-10 40 27 2.2 1.9 14.8 12.5 4 3.3 2.2 10.5 18.8 5 2.9 1.8 15.6 8.7 4 3.1 2.5 1.4 22.2
11-20 40 27 1.2 0.8 19.2 7.0 3 2.8 1.7 10.9 13.2 5 2.0 1.0 15.8 8.5 5 2.8 1.7 10.3 17.3
21-30 40 27 1.1 0.3 20.5 2.7 3 1.7 0.7 14.8 6.9 4 1.5 0.7 18.8 3.9 6 2.6 1.6 11.3 11.2
31-40 40 38 1.2 0.6 19.3 5.4 0 0 2 2.3 0.8 14.2 7.6
41-50 40 36 1.0 0.1 20.9 1.1 1 2.0 1.0 11.7 9.3 2 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 1 1.5 0.5 16.0 4.5
Group 8
all 200 152 1.2 0.7 19.5 5.2 9 2.2 1.5 15.8 12.0 27 1.3 0.8 18.3 6.9 12 4.8 2.0 11.4 16.9
1-10 40 31 1.6 1.0 17.6 7.5 4 3.1 1.6 14.1 15.4 3 1.7 1.1 14.8 10.1 2 5.3 1.8 7.3 16.1
11-20 40 28 1.3 0.8 18.7 6.0 2 2.0 1.2 11.7 10.9 8 1.4 1.0 16.8 9.1 2 3.8 0.4 20.8 4.2
21-30 40 29 1.1 0.5 19.8 4.2 0 7 1.3 0.6 18.2 5.3 4 5.5 1.9 15.0 13.0
31-40 40 31 1.0 0.1 20.9 1.1 1 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 6 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 2 4.5 2.6 -1.0 23.6
41-50 40 33 1.1 0.5 20.5 4.4 2 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 3 1.0 0.0 20.8 0.3 2 4.3 1.9 11.3 15.8
Average of all groups
all 200 161.3 1.4 1.0 18.3 8.0 10.5 2.3 1.7 13.3 13.6 15.5 1.8 1.4 15.7 11.0 12.8 4.0 2.0 11.0 16.1
1-10 40 31.6 2.1 1.5 15.2 11.6 3.6 3.0 1.7 10.3 15.0 2.3 2.3 1.4 13.1 10.3 2.5 3.9 2.1 8.6 17.2
11-20 40 31.3 1.4 0.9 18.1 7.7 2.8 2.0 1.3 13.1 11.5 4.0 2.3 1.8 10.6 15.3 2.0 3.7 1.4 12.5 13.2
21-30 40 30.1 1.2 0.5 19.3 4.5 2.8 1.7 0.8 17.2 5.1 4.4 1.5 0.7 18.1 5.6 2.8 4.5 1.5 13.5 11.2
31-40 40 34.4 1.2 0.5 19.4 4.1 0.8 1.7 0.6 16.5 5.5 2.4 1.2 0.5 19.4 4.3 2.5 4.2 1.5 12.4 13.2
41-50 40 33.9 1.2 0.4 19.5 3.9 0.6 1.4 0.4 17.4 3.7 2.5 1.0 0.0 20.7 0.7 3.0 3.7 1.3 15.2 11.6This working paper has been produced by
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